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CHOOSING JUSTICES: A POLITICAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS AND THE WAGES 
OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
John C. Yoo* 
IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT. By Terri Jennings Peretti. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999. Pp. ix, 371. $27.50 
PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION 
OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES. By David Alistair Yalof. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1999. Pp. x, 296. $27.50 
William H. Rehnquist is not going to be Chief Justice forever -
much to the chagrin of Republicans, no doubt. In the last century, 
Supreme Court Justices have retired, on average, at the age of 
seventy-one after approximately fourteen years on the bench.1 By the 
end of the term of the President we elect this November, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist will have served on the Supreme Court for thirty-two years 
and reached the age of eighty. The law of averages suggests that Chief 
Justice Rehnquist is likely to retire in the next presidential term. 
In addition to replacing Chief Justice Rehnquist, the next Presi­
dent may also enjoy the opportunity to select at least two other Jus­
tices. Justice John Paul Stevens, the next most senior member of the 
Court, will turn eighty-four by the end of the next presidential term 
and will have served on the Court for thirty years. Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor, the third most senior member of the Court, will have 
turned seventy-four and have served for twenty-three years. 
This Review is not intended to be a morbid exercise in the actuar­
ial sciences. Rather, these numbers serve only to suggest that after six 
years in mothballs, the Supreme Court appointments process will be 
returning to active duty in relatively short order. This event will not 
be universally welcomed because many believe that the confirmation 
process has become too political or has failed to live up to the original 
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). 
B.A. 1989, Harvard; J.D. 1992, Yale. - Ed. I thank Jesse Choper, Paul Mishkin, and Robert 
Post for their comments. Jason Beutler provided excellent research assistance. 
1. The median age at retirement has been 70 after 15 years of service. These calcula­
tions are based on statistics found in HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND 
SENATORS: A HISTORY OF TIIE U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM 
WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 379-81 (1999). 
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constitutional design.2 The relatively uncontroversial appointments of 
Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg notwithstand­
ing, the political struggles over the nominations of Justice Clarence 
Thomas and Judge Robert H. Bork, and of Justice Rehnquist to be 
Chief Justice, suggest that future nominations will be contentious. If, 
as Professor Robert Nagel has observed, judicial power has expanded 
such that "in one direction or another, the Court will be a pervasive 
influence on a wide range of issues that can only in a partial and pe­
ripheral way be considered legal rather than political,"3 it is only inevi­
table that players in the political process will seek to advance their 
preferences via Supreme Court nominations. Political attention in the 
next few years may even be greater than usual because the next Presi­
dent's appointments may well determine the Court's direction on 
high-profile issues, such as federalism, race, religion, and criminal pro­
cedure, that have been decided only by five-to-four votes. 
Given the importance of the issues that nominees will decide if ap­
pointed, and the recent history of political struggles over the proper 
standards to apply to confirmations, it would seem to be the job of the 
legal academy to dispense useful advice that might lead to a more sta­
ble, non-controversial process. Academics, however, not only have 
provided little guidance for improving the Supreme Court appoint­
ments process, but often have taken an active role in these political 
battles. Further, scholars seem just as divided over what approach to 
take - whether Presidents and Senators should appoint nominees 
who are merely professionally qualified, or whether they should 
choose only those who agree with their political or jurisprudential 
preferences - as are the politicians.4 It seems fair to say that finding a 
satisfactory answer to the "confirmation mess," as Professor Stephen 
Carter has aptly described it, has frustrated our best constitutional 
thinkers.5 
2 See, e.g., Stephen Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1185 
(1988). 
3. Robert F. Nagel, Advice, Consent, and Influence, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 858, 860 (1990). 
4. One can see this gap in the many articles and symposia that have appeared about the 
judicial appointments process since the struggle over the nominations of Judge Robert Bork 
and Justice Clarence Thomas. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1164 (1988); Bruce Fein, Commentary, A Circumscribed Senate Confir­
mation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672 (1989); John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, 
the Constitution and the Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 
71 TEXAS L. REV. 633 (1993); Henry P. Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Poli­
tics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the 
Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE LJ. 1491 (1992); Symposium, Confir­
mation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 832 
(1990); Symposium, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments: The 
Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1992); Collo­
quium, The Judicial Nomination and Confirmation Process, 7 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. 
COMMENTARY 1 (1991). 
5. See Carter, supra note 2. 
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The likelihood that political and scholarly confusion will accom­
pany the return of the confirmation process makes the appearance of 
two books, Terri Jennings Peretti's In Defense of A Political Court, 
and David Alistair Yalof's In Pursuit of Justices1, particularly welcome 
and timely. Both written by political scientists, these works provide 
different views of the appointments process from which legal scholars 
have much to learn. While much of the legal literature, for example, 
has focused on the standards that the Senate ought to apply in con­
firming Justices, Yalof instead examines the more decisive process of 
presidential selection of Supreme Court nominees. Peretti, whose 
work aims at a wider-ranging discussion of the purposes of judicial re­
view and the roots of the Court's legitimacy, approaches the question 
in a significant, and perhaps novel, manner. Instead of recycling the 
same qualifications-versus-politics debate, she first seeks to determine 
the proper role of the Supreme Court in the American political sys­
tem, and from that inquiry infers the type of Justices that we should 
want. All too often, legal scholars debating Supreme Court appoint­
ments have ignored the fundamental issue of the Court's role, which 
Peretti argues should determine the way we think about choosing Jus­
tices. 
This review will proceed in three parts. Part I will summarize and 
critique Yalof, while Part II will discuss Peretti. Part III will take up 
Peretti's challenge by attempting to rethink the appointments process 
in light of different theories of judicial review. I will argue that neither 
the indeterminacy of constitutional decisionmaking, as Peretti would 
have it, nor the expansion of judicial review, as many of our leading 
constitutional law professors believe, provides the sole explanation for 
the politicization of the confirmation process. Rather, I will argue that 
the emergence of judicial claims to supremacy in constitutional inter­
pretation has much to do with the growing political attention to the 
ideology of Court nominees. In the conclusion, I will offer more prac­
tical reform ideas for the appointments process, based on the preced­
ing sections. 
I. 
Professor Y al of ends where most law professors begin. With a few 
exceptions, scholars writing about the appointments process have fo­
cused almost exclusively on the Senate's role in confirming Justices.8 
6. Terri Jennings Peretti is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of 
Connecticut. 
7. David Alistair Yalof is an Assistant Professor of Political Science, Santa Clara Uni­
versity. 
8. See sources cited supra note 4; see also John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 GREENBAG 
2d 277, 282-86 (1998) (discussing Senate's discretion in reviewing judicial nominees). 
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After reading Y al of s book, one is left with the impression that we 
have missed half the picture. As Y alof points out, even with the con­
firmation struggles of the last few decades, in the last 100 years the 
Senate has approved eighty-nine percent of the President's nominees 
to the Supreme Court (p. viii). Twelve of the last fourteen nominees 
to the Court have received Senate approval. "In overemphasizing the 
confirmation process we may be neglecting the most critical decision­
making stage in most Supreme Court appointments," Y alof argues, 
namely the President's selection process (p. viii). Legal scholars 
would be wise to pay attention to the presidency, Yalof continues, be­
cause selection and confirmation constitute "a seamless web," in 
which mistakes in choosing a nominee may cause a contentious con­
firmation (p. viii). 
Seeking to understand the first half of the appointments equation, 
Yalof organizes his analysis around case studies of each Supreme 
Court nominee from 1945 to 1987, whether they were confirmed or 
not. Unlike the rumor-filled snippets one sees in the newspapers, In 
Pursuit of Justices establishes a more authoritative record of why can­
didates make short lists but not the final cut. Y alof has assembled his 
historical account through extensive use of presidential archives and 
personal interviews with former presidents, attorneys general, and 
White House chiefs of staff and counsels. These short stories provide 
reason enough to buy this book, especially for anyone hoping to be­
come a Supreme Court Justice. This enticement should place Yalof 
on the bestseller list for legal books. If the old saying that every Sena­
tor believes that he or she can (and should) become President is true, 
then the pool of contenders for a seat on the Supreme Court must be 
orders of magnitude larger. 
These stories also make for entertaining gossip, at times. One 
learns, for example, that President Clinton resisted appointing Justice 
Stephen Breyer to Justice White's seat because he felt that "Breyer 
was selling himself too hard, that his interests in the law were too nar­
row, that he didn't have a big heart."9 According to Yalof, President 
Clinton offered the job twice to Secretary of Education Richard Riley, 
who turned him down quickly both times (pp. 197-98). In her personal 
interview with President Reagan, Yalof reports, Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor emphasized her personal opposition to abortion and her 
belief that abortion was a legitimate subject for legislative regulation 
(p. 140). Yalof indicates that President Kennedy might have chosen 
Professor Paul Freund for Justice White's eventual seat, but for his re-
9. P. 200 (citations omitted). Unlike most of Yalofs research, much of the information 
concerning the Ointon and Bush administrations relies upon newspaper stories and books 
found briefly in the current events section of the bookstore. This, no doubt, is because 
presidential archival records are not yet available and administration officials may still feel 
some reticence in discussing decisions that occurred so recently. 
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fusal to serve as Solicitor General under Robert Kennedy, a rejection 
the young Attorney General took personally (p. 77). Apparently, 
Freund was persuaded by the advice of Felix Frankfurter that no job, 
not even that of Solicitor General, was worth that of a Harvard law 
professor, except for that of a Supreme Court Justice (p. 77). On a 
more bizarre note, the book indicates that when Chief Justice Burger 
retired, young lawyers in the White House Counsel's office removed 
Judge Ralph Winter, a well known conservative judge on the Second 
Circuit and a law professor at Yale, from consideration, in part be­
cause he was "not known for intensive preparation for class" (p. 152; 
citations omitted). If that eliminates one for a Supreme Court seat, 
many in the law professoriat will have their hopes dashed.10 
These stories make In Search of Justices doubly welcome because 
they provide a break from much political science work about the 
Supreme Court. These days, it seems the fashionable thing is to clas­
sify every judicial decision into a few categories, so it can be incorpo­
rated into a huge database from which earth-shattering trends are 
spotted, like the tendency of Republican appointees to favor the po­
lice in criminal procedural cases. Y alof admirably bucks this trend, al­
though, as a political scientist, he cannot resist the urge to identify 
several factors and frameworks that he believes govern the appoint­
ments process. He lists five political factors that constrain a presi­
dent's constitutional discretion to nominate whom he chooses: (i) the 
timing of a vacancy; (ii) the composition of the Senate; (iii) the presi­
dent's public approval ratings; (iv) the outgoing Justice's status and 
position on the ideological spectrum; and (v) the realistic pool of can­
didates (pp. 4-6). 
Y al of follows this up with two more efforts to categorize the judi­
cial nomination process. According to the author, Presidents since 
1945 have employed three "decisional frameworks" in making 
Supreme Court appointments: a) an "open" framework, in which the 
selection machinery starts up after a vacancy occurs; b) a "single­
candidate focused" framework, in which the President has settled on a 
candidate in advance; and c) a "criteria-driven" framework in which 
the President sets in advance certain criteria that prospective nomi­
nees must meet (p. 6). President Clinton's appointments characterize 
open frameworks; President Johnson's choices of Thurgood Marshall 
and Abe Fortas fall within the single-candidate framework; and Presi­
dent Reagan's nominations of Justice Scalia and Judge Bork meet the 
definition of the criteria-driven approach, in which the main factor was 
10. As a former student of Judge Winter's in corporations and securities regulation, I 
can attest to the fact that whatever these young White House lawyers had thought of Judge 
Wmter's level of preparation, he was an effective and successful teacher and mentor to stu­
dents. Plus, he told a lot of funny jokes in class, which distinguished him from many of his 
colleagues. 
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judicial ideology. Yalof then introduces a list of ten factors that he 
believes have shaped the modem judicial selection process, which in­
cludes developments ranging from the bureaucratization of the Justice 
Department, to the expanded power of the Supreme Court, to the rise 
of divided government, to the appearance of interest group participa­
tion and media attention, to the innovation of computerized legal re­
search (pp. 12-18). 
Yalof fails to make clear, however, how useful these different 
frameworks, factors, and lists are in explaining the success of presiden­
tial strategies in selecting Justices. Yalof claims that the open frame­
work allows the President more flexibility to respond to the changing 
political environment, but that this comes at the price of his or her 
long-term goals for the Court, which might be better served by a crite­
ria-driven structure. Pursuit of Justices implies that the need to meet 
the immediate political environment will require presidents to sacri­
fice their judicial agenda. Stripped of all of the frameworks, Y alof's 
theory reduces to a study of the usual trade-off between politics and 
policy. Yet, Yalof never demonstrates in a satisfying manner whether 
his many case studies support these conclusions. In part, Y al of cannot 
make this connection because he does not attempt to evaluate presi­
dential success in terms of the President's own goals for the Court. He 
also leaves the link between the case studies and his frameworks un­
made because he often does not (or cannot) recreate the political cost­
and-benefit choices that presidents have made in selecting Justices. 
Y alof's discussions of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower exem­
plify this disconnect between the case studies and the theory. We 
learn that Truman's main goal in Supreme Court appointments was 
cronyism. Truman sought to nominate only Justices who were part of 
his close-knit political circle because he never had any clear agenda 
concerning the Supreme Court. Thus, he chose Harold Burton, an old 
friend and former Senate colleague, to be an associate Justice, and 
Fred Vinson, a poker buddy, to be Chief Justice (pp. 21-33). Yalof 
notes that while Truman adopted an open framework, he remained 
relatively immune to advice and clearly kept personal control over the 
process. Truman's use of an open selection process, therefore, appar­
ently made little difference in the ultimate choice of a nominee. Yalof 
judges Truman's four Justices to have been mediocre, due to the 
president's desire to dominate the nomination process with his per­
sonal choices (pp. 39-40). Yet, Yalof does not ask whether Truman's 
true goal was to appoint "superlative Justices," in some objective 
sense, or whether he simply sought to use the Court as a vehicle for 
patronage. If his objective was the latter, then Truman appears to 
have satisfied his agenda for the Supreme Court. 
Yalof's account of the Eisenhower administration is also unsatis­
fying. In response to Truman's cronyism, Eisenhower sought to ap­
point "individuals of the highest possible standing" (p. 42; citations 
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omitted). Continuing his practice as Supreme Allied Commander 
during World War II, Eisenhower delegated considerable authority to 
subordinates. In the area of judicial selection, Eisenhower relied upon 
his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, to develop the list of candi­
dates to be considered. Eisenhower established, however, rigid crite­
ria that sought to exclude judicial "left wingers," to use the president's 
words, and instead encouraged the appointment of "highly qualified, 
moderate" republicans who shared his "middle of the road" political 
philosophy (p. 42). He also made clear his desire to nominate candi­
dates who were relatively young, so as to outlast a Democratic presi­
dential successor, and who had previous judicial experience, so as to 
foreclose the potential appointment of New Deal Justices such as 
Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas. Quoting historians Gunther Bischof 
and Stephen Ambrose, Yalof describes Eisenhower's criteria as "[n]o 
senators with a somewhat radical reputation (Black), no allegedly 
radical college professors (Frankfurter), no bright young lawyer­
professor types who rose to fame as tamers of Wall Street (Douglas)" 
(p. 43; citations omitted). 
Although Yalof argues that a criteria-driven framework will yield 
more principled results, it is unclear whether Eisenhower's appoint­
ments achieved the President's Supreme Court agenda. His first two 
appointments did not even live up to the framework. Earl Warren re­
ceived the Chief Justiceship because Eisenhower had promised him 
the first Court vacancy in exchange for Warren's support at a crucial 
turning point in the Republican convention of 1952. John Marshall 
Harlan received the next nomination because Brownell, his close per­
sonal friend, had promised him a seat on the Court. While William 
Brennan did not benefit from any personal ties, his appointment re­
sulted from the administration's political need to nominate a Catholic; 
the Catholic vote had been of critical importance in Eisenhower's 1956 
re-election.11 Not only did the Eisenhower administration imperfectly 
implement a criteria-driven framework, it is also hard to conclude that 
the use of such an approach achieved Eisenhower's goals with regard 
to the Supreme Court. To be sure, two of his appointments, Harlan 
and Potter Stewart, earned respect in the legal community as "lawyer's 
lawyers." Nonetheless, Eisenhower quickly grew frustrated with the 
liberal decisions of Warren and Brennan, and though they would be 
ranked later as two of the five greatest Justices ever to serve on the 
Court, they achieved that fame for reasons that Eisenhower would 
have disapproved. Rather than creating a conservative Court, 
Eisenhower's method in choosing Justices yielded that great bane of 
conservative jurisprudence, the Warren Court. 
11. Brennan's name appears to have arisen because Brownell and his deputy had been 
impressed by a "rousing" speech that Brennan delivered at the Attorney General's "Confer­
ence on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation." See p. 58. 
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Yalof's effort to draw clear rules, frameworks, and flowcharts may 
be unconvincing because the pool of data is still limited.12 One lesson 
emerges, however, that bears significance for the continuing debate 
over the appointments process. Viewed with a different point in mind 
than Y alof s, the case studies suggest that jurisprudential ideology is 
only one of the factors that presidents pursue in nominating Justices. 
Indeed, the behind-the-scenes account of judicial selection from 
Truman through Clinton indicates that ideological factors rarely pre­
dominate over more political or personal factors. Presidents regularly 
have chosen Justices for reasons of electoral politics (as in Nixon's de­
sire to choose a Southerner), personal friendship, promises, political 
imperatives (such as re-election concerns or conserving political capi­
tal), or symbolism (choosing the first African American or woman). 
The rise of interest groups in the appointments process during the 
postwar period exacerbates this phenomenon. Presidents, it seems, 
may choose nominees either to placate an interest group or because a 
group's sympathizers in either the White House or the Justice De­
partment have succeeded in influencing the process. Interest group 
participation makes it even less likely that a nominee's selection re­
sults purely or even mostly from the President's advancement of his 
agenda for the Supreme Court. 
This record complicates the arguments made on behalf of presi­
dential discretion and senatorial deference in Supreme Court ap­
pointments. Supporters of presidential dominance usually claim that 
the President's choice of a Justice is entitled to deference because the 
President, as the only member of the federal government elected by 
the entire nation, enjoys a democratic mandate for advancing his ju­
risprudential agenda. While the Senate has a checking role, so this ar­
gument goes, it ought to reject only nominees who appear to be un­
qualified out of respect for the President's majoritarian support. Even 
if this argument were true, it is unclear whether the Senate should con­
tinue to defer to presidential choices once it becomes clear that consti­
tutional ideology is not the primary factor driving judicial selection. If 
Presidents regularly choose Justices for personal or political reasons, 
in addition to ideological ones, then the Senate perhaps ought to 
ratchet up the intensity of its scrutiny. While we the people may have 
voted for a President because we agree with his constitutional views, 
that mandate loses its force when the President chooses Justices to 
shore up his political support for re-election, or to add to his historical 
legacy, or to pass out judicial plums to his friends.13 
12 See Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appointments, 84 NW. U. L. 
REV. 935, 935 {1990) (questioning whether "scientific generalization about Supreme Court 
appointments" is possible due to limited set of data). 
13. Of course, one might respond that a winning president ought to reward the interest 
groups in his or her coalition that are concerned with judicial selection by appointing their 
c:lesired candidate. In part, this conclusion depends on whether one believes that the Presi-
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II. 
Unlike Yalof, Peretti is not solely focused on the appointments 
process. Rather, her views on Supreme Court appointments grow out 
of a broader theory of judicial review and the role of the Court in the 
American political system. Peretti believes that criticism of the Court 
for judicial activism is misplaced. We should face up to the fact, 
Peretti believes, that the Court is a political actor, that its decisions are 
political, and that constitutional law merely expresses the normative 
preferences of the Justices. According to Peretti, therefore, Presidents 
ought to choose Justices solely to advance their political agenda, and 
the Senate ought to review nominees based on whether it agrees with 
the substantive results they are likely to reach in future cases. We 
should welcome, rather than reject, the growing participation of inter­
est groups, the media, and political campaign methods in the appoint­
ments process. For Peretti, as Clausewitz might put it, the Court is 
merely the continuation of politics by other means. 
Peretti's argument is logical and straightforward. It finds its gene­
sis in the arguments of first the legal realists and then the critical legal 
scholars that judicial decisions are, for the most part, indeterminate. 
According to Peretti, contemporary constitutional theory has failed to 
establish neutral, principled grounds upon which the Supreme Court 
can decide any constitutional question. Originalism is unsatisfying be­
cause it is too difficult to reconstruct the framers' understanding and, 
because all interpretation is open to manipulation, its rules do not 
really restrain judicial discretion in a coherent manner (p. 41). Ap­
plying noninterpretivist theories, such as those of Ronald Dworkin, 
who advocates reliance upon some form of moral philosophy or con­
temporary values in reading the Constitution, does no better.14 There 
may be no widely shared morals or values in the American political 
community; even if they exist, they rest at too abstract a level of gen­
erality to prove useful, and judges have little competence in identify­
ing them (pp. 42-43). Jesse Choper's and John Hart Ely's process­
based theories do not really separate process from substance because 
dent and his mandate are, or ought to be, determined by interest group participation, at the 
expense of the policy views for which he was elected by the general public. Even if one be­
lieved that Presidents are subject to interest group politics in the area of judicial selection 
and ideology, there is no constitutional reason that the Senate ought to defer to the outcome 
of interest group bargaining on this issue. Indeed, one might conclude that the Senate (al­
though itself subject to interest group pressures) ought to react to such a state of affairs by 
enhancing the intensity of its scrutiny of nominees in order to reduce the influence of inter­
est groups on the judiciary. 
14. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2-38 (1996). 
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representation-reinforcing values are easily manipulated and ulti­
mately require substantive value choices as well.15 
Because no theory has convincingly solved the countermajoritarian 
problem, Peretti argues that we should put aside our illusions about 
neutral judicial decisionmaking and embrace the notion that not only 
are Court decisions political, but that they ought to be. "[V]alue­
voting and political motive," Peretti argues, are "both necessary and 
legitimate ingredients in constitutional decisionmaking." (p. 77). To 
defend her remarkable thesis, she marshals an impressive array of sec­
ondary literature, mostly from political science, to show that decisions 
based on personal preferences promote democratic values, that the 
Court does not suffer losses in legitimacy and power from political de­
cisions, and that political judicial decisionmaking enhances political 
stability and the dispersion of power. At the very least, Peretti's book 
is useful reading for constitutional law scholars who ought to be more 
aware of the vast work on the Court as an actor in the national politi­
cal system. 
In making her claim about the representative nature of the Court, 
Peretti makes several striking observations about the appointments 
process. Judicial decisionmaking based on political preferences does 
not conflict with democracy, Peretti argues. First, political goals drive 
judicial selection, and second, Justices often remain true to the politics 
of the administration that nominated them. Like Yalof, Peretti high­
lights the importance of political motivations in the presidential selec­
tion of Justices, such as partisan affiliation and political ideology. 
About ninety percent of the judges appointed in each of the last four 
administrations, she notes, have come from the same political party as 
the President (p. 87). Partisan motives also drive Senate confirmation 
practice: the confirmation rate when the President and Senate are of 
different parties is significantly lower (fifty-nine percent) than when 
they are of the same party (eighty-nine percent), efforts to replace Jus­
tices of one party with nominees of the other party double the Senate 
rejection rate, and nominations that both effect such partisan re­
placements and that alter the ideological balance of the Court appear 
to triple the rejection rate (p. 88). Senatorial voting patterns show 
that Senators vote to confirm or reject controversial nominees based 
upon whether they belong �o the same party as the nominating Presi­
dent. Political factors, such as partisan affiliation, presidential political 
strength, or ideology, rather than objective merit or qualifications, de­
termine whether a Justice receives confirmation. It should be noted 
15. Pp. 48-49. Peretti also argues that the more recent "provisional review" theories, 
which would escape the possibilities of judicial tyranny by allowing for initial, nonfinal, non­
binding Supreme Court decisions, only returns to the familiar interpretivist-noninterpretivist 
debate by dra\ving distinctions between Supreme Court decisions that are correct, and hence 
are final, and ones that are not. 
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that Peretti's account here does not mesh well with Yalof's more di­
rect evidence on Supreme Court appointments. According to Yalof, 
some Presidents have consciously chosen to emphasize factors other 
than ideology, such as political cronyism, in choosing their Justices. 
Peretti's approach to the Court and its Justices cannot account for the 
actual record on presidential selection of Justices. 
Nonetheless, Peretti faces a significant obstacle in her explanation 
of the political nature of the appointments process. One should see 
far less struggle between the President and the Senate over Supreme 
Court appointments, the Rehnquist, Bork, and Thomas nomination 
fights notwithstanding, if she were correct that judicial selection was 
simply subject to the same political process that governed, for exam­
ple, legislation or administrative rulemaking. Given the divided gov­
ei.-nment that generally has prevailed in the postwar period, Peretti's 
thesis would have predicted substantial political controversy over the 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter nominations. Nonetheless, while the 
Senate has rejected twenty percent of all Supreme Court nominees in 
its history, only five nominees have failed to win Senate confirmation 
in the twentieth century (p. 94). Peretti attempts to downplay this 
evidence by arguing that recent Presidents have adjusted their nomi­
nations, depending on the power of the opposition party in the Senate, 
in order to reduce confrontation with the Senate and to conserve their 
political power. Ultimately, she admits, as she must, that "the compe­
tition between the Senate and president has not, in recent years, been 
as vigorous or as balanced as it should be to insure the Court's repre­
sentativeness" (p. 99). 
Putting this problem to one side, Peretti then advances the argu­
ment that political representation on the Court translates into politi­
cally sensitive decisionmaking by the Justices. According to Peretti, 
"the link between the value premises of a Justice's selection and then 
the value premises of her subsequent decisions is significant and con­
sequential and constitutes an indirect form of political representation" 
(p. 84). Justices apparently dance with the person who brought them 
to the party. Surveying a rich political science literature (known pri­
marily as the "attitudinal" model), Peretti observes that a strong link 
exists between a Justice's personal values and his or her decisions over 
time. Despite occasional surprises, presidents choose nominees be­
cause they know a candidate's values and they predict that the nomi­
nee will advance a desired ideology once on the bench. Peretti finds 
that at least three-quarters of the Justices generally satisfy presidential 
expectations about their judicial performance (pp. 130-31). The ma­
jority of these Justices prove successful because presidents used their 
appointments as an opportunity to extend their policy influence into 
the future. Presidents who are "surprised" by a nominee's future deci­
sions usually failed to evaluate carefully a nominee's political views, as 
when President Madison appointed Joseph Story, or were subject to 
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constraints generated by other political leaders or by political condi­
tions when they selected a nominee. 
Peretti spends a great deal of effort establishing a link between 
presidential policy goals and judicial voting patterns because the rep­
resentative nature of the Court is key to proving the rest of her thesis. 
Only by showing that the personal values that guide a Justice's deci­
sions are connected to the values that the President (and Senate) vali­
dated in appointing the nominee can In Defense of a Political Court 
make its normative claim that value-voting by the Justices has any ba­
sis in democratic theory. Yalof's evidence, however, seems to throw a 
monkey wrench into Peretti's finely tuned model, as it seems clear 
from his case studies that Presidents have chosen only a few nominees 
because of agreement with their ideological views. Nonetheless, for 
Peretti, voting by personal preference allows the Justices to "reflect or 
represent the political values and policy views currently (or at a mini­
mum recently) receiving official expression and representation in 
other branches of government and, by inference, receiving a signifi­
cant measure of popular support" (p. 131). By voting their personal 
preferences, Peretti argues, Justices counterintuitively advance demo­
cratic control over judicial decisionmaking. She fails to explain, how­
ever, how this occurs as Justices become farther removed from the 
time of their appointment. Nor does Peretti allow any room for the 
case of Justices who change their jurisprudential views over time. 
The rest of the book seeks to defend this paradoxical judicial role 
both by taking apart age-old criticisms of a political Court and by de­
fending the Court's activities as appropriate in a pluralist political sys­
tem. Peretti argues that judicial decisions are not all that threatening 
because the Court's power is easily checked by impeachment, congres­
sional control over the Court's size and jurisdiction, constitutional and 
statutory amendment, the appointments process, and its need for the 
cooperation of the other branches for implementation of its decisions 
(pp. 137-47). Peretti's list only highlights the importance of appoint­
ments, however, as her other techniques for political control over the 
Court are rarely used and are highly controversial. Peretti discards 
the claim that political decisionmaking by the Justices will erode the 
Court's legitimacy by pointing out that public awareness of the Court's 
decisions or of the Justices is low,16 that most Americans do not hold 
the Court as an institution in especially high regard, and that judicial 
decisions that violate some generally held ideals of impartial deci­
sionmaking do not erode public support for the Court (pp. 173-80). 
Therefore, the more political the Court is, the more its decisions are 
politically responsive to views of the public and national elites, and the 
16. In 1989, for example, a public opinion poll showed that only 9 percent of Americans 
could correctly name Rehnquist as Chief Justice, while 54 percent knew that Judge Wapner 
was the jurist on the television show, The People's Court. 
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more likely the Court will receive the political support necessary to 
preserve its authority.• 
Peretti reserves the end of her book for the two most difficult 
challenges to her analysis. First, she addresses the criticism that a po­
litical Court, however vague its representative nature, still acts in con­
flict with democratic values. In responding to this claim, she star­
tlingly embraces pluralist theory. Relying upon the theories of Robert 
Dahl, Peretti argues that regular elections and the legislative process 
are imperfect transmitters of majoritarian preferences, and that in­
stead we ought to view the national political system as promoting a 
pluralist structure in which diverse groups have the opportunity to 
challenge and influence government decisionmaking. Under this 
model, a political Court becomes merely "an alternative arena in 
which dissatisfaction with legislative or administrative decisions can be 
aired" (p. 219). The democratic legitimacy of the Court's authority is 
not important; what counts is that the Court establishes a different 
avenue for citizen and group desires to express themselves, and ulti­
mately for widespread consensus for government decisions to be gen­
erated. 
Peretti's second challenge arises from the first. If a political Court 
serves only as another forum in a pluralist system, why vest any power 
in such a redundant body at all? Her answer takes two parts. First, 
the Court provides a forum for groups that might be systematically ex­
cluded from the political process. Here, it is hard to distinguish her 
argument from the theories of Carolene Products, Jesse Choper, and 
John Hart Ely, which she had criticized earlier in the book. Second, 
the Court serves as an important fine-tuning instrument in the public 
policy process. It more precisely fashions public policies to specific 
situations and provides a feedback mechanism to the lawmakers. 
In honestly addressing these questions, Peretti deserves much 
praise. Peretti is an obvious fan, if not a card-carrying member, of the 
critical legal studies ("CLS") movement.17 CLS criticisms of the myth 
of objectivity in constitutional law, as in other areas of law, have value, 
but they have suffered from several shortcomings. Most glaringly, 
CLS has failed to promote any positive solution to replace the results 
of its attack in all directions on the objectivity and neutrality of law. 
For that reason, my colleague Phillip Johnson has compared critical 
legal studies to the work of an adolescent who revels in criticizing eve­
rything, but solving nothing.18 CLS work on constitutional law reduces 
to an utterly result-driven enterprise in which achieving utopian social 
visions amounts to the only guide to legal decisionmaking. Peretti's 
17. See pp. 36-45 (finding convincing CLS claims of "judicial subjectivity" and "constitu­
tional indeterminacy"). 
18. See Phillip E. Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be a Radical?, 36 STAN. L .  REV. 
247, 248 (1984). 
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work represents a serious effort to avoid this problem by sketching out 
a positive role for the Court in a CLS world where law really is noth­
ing more than politics. 
Despite this worthy effort, Peretti's work does not fully satisfy. If 
the law really is just politics, then constitutional law serves only as the 
expression of temporary policy preferences. By advancing its own 
ideological agenda, the Court merely serves as the means for that ex­
pression. Many constitutional law scholars will find it difficult to agree 
with this conclusion because Peretti's approach allows for no objective 
judgment or criticism of a judicial decision.19 Peretti must acknowl­
edge, therefore, that not only was the Lochner Court right, since it ex­
pressed the political views of the Justices of its day, but so too were 
the Courts of Dred Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Korematsu, among 
others. If the Court is playing politics, and the political system allows 
the Court to pursue its agenda, then what the Court decides is, ipse 
dixit, constitutional. CLS-inspired analysis of constitutional law, ironi­
cally, devolves into a defense of the status quo, in that if law is just 
politics, then the problem is with the national society and culture and 
its preferences, rather than with constitutional law. Agreement with 
the notion that the law represents only the product of collective politi­
cal, social, and cultural preferences that allow elites to dominate soci­
ety means that there is not all that much any of us can do to reform 
the law or the Court. 
Even if Peretti were right that constitutional law is just the 
continuation of politics by other means, she still fails to offer a 
convincing reason why we ought to vest any authority in the judicial 
branch. If the Court's function is purely political, it is difficult to see 
why we should not replace the Court with an alternative forum for the 
expression of group preferences, such as an agency or congressional 
office. Peretti offers no reason to think that judges are especially 
adept at performing the pluralist role she imposes on them; indeed, 
due to their isolation from the political system, they might be 
exceptionally inept at performing this function. Her answer that the 
Court has a distinctive role in fine-tuning public policy is not 
compelling in light of the record of the courts in frustrating and 
distorting the implementation of public policy in the United States.20 
Further, as recent works by Gerald Rosenberg21 and Michael 
19. Admitting this, she declares that there "are simply no absolute imperatives about 
the particular values or group interests that the Court must advance and protect." P. 233. 
20. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. 
POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991); see also JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: 
How PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PuBLIC POLICY (1989). 
21. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
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Klarman22 have argued, the Court does a poor job of achieving social 
change, and, as some have maintained, the federal courts suffer from a 
number of structural difficulties in implementing their constitutional 
visions in a complex society.23 The inescapable conclusion to Peretti's 
analysis seems to be that we ought to take away any public policy 
function from the courts. 
Peretti's inability to offer a better explanation for the role of a po­
litical Court highlights a critical non sequitur in her argument. Even if 
the grounds for judicial decisionmaking were substantially indetermi­
nate, it does not follow that the Court's role must be understood 
within a pluralist framework. In Defense of a Political Court provides 
no defense for the choice of the theory of Robert Dahl over those of 
John Rawls or Karl Marx. While Peretti has emptied judicial review 
of the idea of neutral constitutional adjudication, she simply has re­
placed it with yet another theory, that of seeking political stability 
through pluralist consensus-building, with little effort at explanation. 
Further, Peretti confuses pluralism's descriptive enterprise for norma­
tive justifications. It may be the case that much of modern American 
politics can be explained through the lens of interest group politics, al­
though institutionalist and positive political theory work may have 
thrown this conclusion into doubt. Nonetheless, Peretti fails to ex­
plain why the Supreme Court or the other branches of government 
ought to adopt pluralism's normative goals - political stability, mod­
erate policy choices, and social satisfaction - rather than other possi­
ble values in public lawmaking, such as social justice, rational policy 
choice, economic efficiency, or republican deliberation. Left-wing 
thinkers, for example, have criticized pluralism for centralizing politi­
cal power in social elites, for pacifying groups oppressed by the capi­
talist system, and generally for suppressing other forms of political 
struggle based on broader classifications than mere interest groups.24 
Peretti adopts CLS methods to show that all law is indeterminate, but 
she provides no defense of her choice of political values in response to 
criticism from the same quarter. 
In Defense of a Political Court proves ultimately unsatisfying 
because of its barren vision of the Constitution. If constitutional law 
becomes only the personal preferences of the Justices, then the 
Constitution itself does not impose limitations upon government 
22. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. 
L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revo­
lutions, 82 v A. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
23. See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Re­
medial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123, 1137-41 (1996). 
24. See, e.g., William E. Connolly, The Challenge to Pluralist Theory, in THE BIAS OF 
PLURALISM 3 (William E. Connolly ed., 1969); Frank Cunningham, Pluralism and Class 
Struggle, 39 SCI. & SOC'Y 385, 415-16 (1975-76). 
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power. For Peretti, the Court and the political branches might limit 
the breadth and depth of government action, but only for political 
reasons. If the people today believe that we should do away with 
federalism and the separation of powers, Peretti would not let the 
Constitution stand in the way. If the Court permitted the national 
government to harm racial minority groups, Peretti provides us with 
no way to dispute the constitutionality of that act. According to In 
Defense of a Political Court, the Constitution exerts no real binding 
force on prosecutors and police in their handling of suspects and 
defendants, it imposes no rules on government treatment of religious 
groups, and it provides no real guarantees for rights of due process or 
privacy. Not only is it impossible for us to judge the correctness of 
Chief Justice Taney's decision in Dred Scott, we cannot even decide 
whether we agree with the dissent or with Abraham Lincoln's 
criticisms of the case, aside from expressing our opposition to slavery 
on political or moral grounds. 
While In Defense of a Political Court admirably remains true to its 
initial intellectual assumptions, its conclusions on this score suggest 
that its initial observations were not as compelling as at first glance. 
To be sure, it seems undeniable that personal values have driven some 
of the decisions of some of the Justices. Yet, Peretti has not shown 
(which I think that she must) that Justices have value-voted in every 
case. One can identify many examples where Justices voted against 
their personal preferences because they believed that the Constitution 
required a different result.25 While there may be many people whose 
actions and understandings are caught in the amber of the dominant 
values in our society, Justices are probably the actors with the most 
freedom to defy those structures. Peretti also goes too far in 
suggesting that the Constitution lacks meaning and force except as one 
norm among many others. There are · many things that the 
government today does not attempt because of the Constitution's 
requirements. For the most part, the government has not restricted 
political speech in our history, it still operates within the broad 
outlines of the original separation of powers, and states still enjoy 
some elements of sovereignty. To be sure, this is a difficult point for 
Peretti to prove because it is impossible to demonstrate how 
American history would have been different if there had been only an 
utterly malleable Constitution. Nonetheless, despite the many 
adjustments to, and modifications of, constitutional meaning over the 
last two centuries, many of the outlines of the original Constitution 
remain today. 
25. Some cases where Justices probably voted against their preferences on the merits of 
the public policy issues at stake include Justice Scalia in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
{1989) (concerning flag burning), Chief Justice Rehnquist in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 
{1988) (concerning the authority of independent counsel), and Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (concerning abortion). 
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Rather than devoting so much energy toward showing that there is 
no such thing as constitutional law, Peretti might have more usefully 
asked why there is so much constitutional law all around us. If Peretti 
were correct that constitutional law really boils down to personal pref­
erences and political ideologies, we should have dispensed with the 
Constitution a long time ago, given the temptations and political im­
peratives that have arisen in the nation's history. Peretti's theory of 
law as politics cannot explain why a European welfare state model of 
government did not fully emerge in the wake of the Great Depression, 
or why the United States has never witnessed successful communist, 
socialist, or religious political parties. Peretti cannot explain why we 
still have a separation of powers, despite the emergence of an adminis­
trative state, or why we still have sovereign states, even with the na­
tionalization of markets and society.26 
The answer to these questions, some have suggested, is that the 
Constitution establishes enduring norms that impose observable limits 
on government authority. This should not be surprising. As a multi­
cultural society constantly replenished by successive waves of immi­
gration, the American people do not share a common genealogical, 
cultural, religious or geographic heritage. If there is anything that 
binds the many different groups that make up the American people, it 
is the Constitution, which serves as America's civic religion. Interest 
groups may vie for influence in a pluralist system in which the Court is 
a political actor, but the Justices (as well as the other actors in the po­
litical system) may not enjoy the political freedom to value-vote, as 
Peretti would have it, because they have already internalized the Con­
stitution's values of the separation of powers, federalism, and individ­
ual rights. Put a different way, Peretti's theory views preferences as 
independent of political activity; what she fails to understand is that 
the Constitution itself, as well as the act of engaging in political delib­
eration, may generate and shape preferences. 
All of this is not to say that Justices do not pursue ideological or 
political agendas on the Court. What Peretti has confused, however, is 
the difference between politics broadly defined and differences over 
judicial ideology. Peretti believes not only that Justices have specific 
preferences on policy questions such as social security, taxes, and in­
ternational relations, but also that they pursue their goals by voting 
their beliefs. Current Justices, it seems to me, do not vote in most 
cases because they agree with a legislature or agency's outcome on a 
specific policy question, but rather they take account of broader con­
siderations abut the proper role of the Court, vis-a-vis the other 
branches and the states, in public lawmaking and in interpreting the 
Constitution. To borrow the distinction made by H.L.A. Hart, Jus-
26. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism, Some Notes on a National 
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). 
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tices pursue their own ideology considering the rules of recognition -
the process by which society makes laws - rather than the substantive 
rules - themselves.27 Thus, the Justices may have different personal 
attitudes toward affirmative action or abortion or the death penalty, 
but these views need not correlate with their votes on how much def­
erence the judiciary ought to provide to Congress, or how far the Bill 
of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments go in removing certain 
issues from the control of either the states or the federal government. 
While these disputes, no doubt, are political or ideological, they form 
a far more narrow category that excludes the wider philosophical, 
moral, intellectual, or partisan differences that shape politicians' and 
people's views on policy questions. 
Issues of judicial ideology, as opposed to general policy conflicts, 
do not pose the same concerns about the comparative political incom­
petence or the unrepresentative nature of the Court. As opposed to 
questions of policy that require political leaders to represent the pol­
icy's values, or that involve choices between different social costs and 
benefits, questions of legal and constitutional dimension - such as 
what branches should make certain decisions, what decisions are re­
moved from politics completely, or what institutional procedures are 
necessary to promote the rule of law - seem to fall within the special 
competence of judges and lawyers. Indeed these questions may be the 
very "political" questions that are best suited for judicial resolution. 
By focusing on only broader political value-voting, Peretti fails to see 
that more subtle differences over judicial and constitutional ideology 
can be particularly legal and not just a subterfuge for politics-as-usual. 
The next Part will show why judicial ideology bears particular impor­
tance for the appointments process. 
III. 
Despite these difficulties with her law-as-politics thesis, Peretti 
makes the important contribution of clarifying how we ought to think 
about the judicial appointments process. After the Bork and Thomas 
confirmation hearings, scholars reached a stopping point in their 
analysis of the relative roles of the Senate and President. Henry 
Monaghan nicely expresses the reigning scholarly consensus; after ex­
amining the constitutional text, structure, and history, he finds no con­
stitutional barriers that restrict the Senate's freedom in examining a 
nominee's judicial or political ideology.28 Once Monaghan acknowl-
27. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 91-96 (1961). 
28. See Henry Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1202, 1207 (1988); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Book Review, Straightening Out 
the Confirmation Mess, 105 YALE L.J. 549, 562 (1995); Charles Black, A Note on Senatorial 
Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970). 
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edges that politics govern the appointments process, there is not much 
more for the law to say. Differing only slightly from Monaghan's basic 
conclusions, other prominent legal scholars have urged the Senate to 
consider more than qualifications in the confirmation process. Some, 
like Laurence Tribe, argue that the Senate ought to articulate its own 
vision of constitutional law and enforce it through confirmations,29 
while others, such as Stephen Carter, believe that the Senate ought to 
examine nominees for their moral character.30 Robert Nagel, who ac­
cepts a norm of substantive, ideological review by the Senate, believes 
that confirmation hearings present the opportunity for legal thinking 
to be exposed to political values and forms of discourse so that the 
Justices can understand the political consequences of their decisions.31 
Many of these conclusions seem driven by the idea that if the Jus­
tices are acting as the legal realists would predict, then the Senate 
ought to intervene more aggressively in examining a nominee's per­
sonal views. Although In Defense of a Political Court begins with that 
assumption, it skillfully moves beyond it. Peretti's signal contribution 
is her effort to link the appointments process not just to how we think 
Justices make decisions, but also to our understanding of the role of 
the Court in the political system. As a normative matter, the Senate's 
approach to appointments should reflect the grounds upon which judi­
cial review is based, and the manner in which the other branches re­
spond to its exercise. It is not enough, as previous writers have done, 
to declare that the Constitution imposes no standards on the President 
or Senate in choosing their nominees, and then to throw up one's 
hands in despair. As I have argued elsewhere, based on my experi­
ence serving as General Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
even when the Constitution does not impose specific standards to 
guide government officials, the members of the political branches still 
develop quasi-constitutional norms to limit the exercise of their ple­
nary or discretionary functions.32 We should seek to determine the ba­
sis of judicial review and its role in the political system, and then infer 
from that relationship the quasi-constitutional norms that should 
guide the President and Senate in choosing Justices. 
The first step in this analysis is to understand the significant change 
in the nature of judicial review that began during the Warren Court 
and has accelerated during the Rehnquist years. Initially, judicial re­
view was a modest doctrine based on a narrow reading of the Court's 
powers. In Marbury v. Madison,33 Chief Justice John Marshall did not 
29. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, Goo SA VE THIS HONORABLE COURT 131 (1985). 
30. See Carter, supra note 2, at 1199. 
31. See Nagel, supra note 3, at 873. 
32 See John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1998, 
at 1, 16-18. 
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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invalidate Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 because the Court 
had an important role in settling great political questions or in articu­
lating social norms. Rather, judicial review arose from the nature of a 
written Constitution and the Court's role in resolving cases and con­
troversies involving federal law. It was inevitable, Marshall noted, 
that cases brought to the Court would raise conflicts between statutes 
and claims based on the Constitution. As a written document adopted 
through popular ratification, the Constitution expressed higher law 
that superseded any ordinary legislative enactment. Therefore, in de­
ciding a case between two parties, Marshall concluded, the Court had 
to give effect to the higher law of the Constitution over more ephem­
eral legislation. 
[I]f both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that 
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disre­
garding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding 
the law . . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules 
governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If then the 
courts are to regard the constitution; and the constitution is superior to 
any ordinary act of the legislature; the constitution, and not such ordi­
nary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.34 
Judicial review springs from the judiciary's unique fµnction in deciding 
cases or controversies under federal law.35 
Marbury's grounding of judicial review in the Court's case­
deciding function left ample room for the other branches to engage in 
constitutional interpretation while performing their own constitutional 
duties. This departmentalist understanding of constitutional review 
recognizes that the President and Senate may use their own plenary 
powers to restrict, frustrate, or challenge the decisions of the Court. 
Often associated with Thomas Jefferson, this theory of concurrent re­
view assumes that each branch of the government is coordinate, equal, 
and supreme within its own sphere of action.36 President Jefferson, for 
example, enforced his belief that the Alien and Sedition Acts were un­
constitutional by refusing to prosecute offenders. As he wrote to 
Abigail Adams, 
You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity of 
the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right 
to decide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for 
34. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
35. See ROBERT L. CLINTON, MARBURY v. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 15-17 
(1989). 
36. See id.; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 94-96 
(1986); Michael S. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the 
Law ls, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 228-38, 255-62 (1994). 
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them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of action 
assigned to them.37 
Jefferson articulated the same theory in considering whether to resist 
Marshall's subpoena for papers involving the Burr conspiracy.38 Fol­
lowing the departmentalist understanding of judicial review, President 
Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to incorporate the Bank of the United 
States, even though the Supreme Court had held in McCulloch v. 
Maryland that Congress could establish the Bank under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.39 Wrote Jackson: "The Congress, the Executive, 
and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the 
Constitution. "40 
Judicial review's originally modest grounds also leave a legitimate 
avenue for resistance to Supreme Court decisions. If the Court has 
embarked on a direction that is unfaithful to the Constitution, the 
people can act through the other branches of government to forestall 
the Court in the hopes that it may reverse itself. As President 
Abraham Lincoln declared in his first inaugural address, "I do not for­
get the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to 
be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions 
must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object 
of that suit."41 Nonetheless, he continued, "the evil effect following 
[an erroneous decision], being limited to that particular case, with the 
chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for 
other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different 
practice."42 Because the effects of judicial review are limited to the 
case presented, Lincoln even suggests that the Court's decisions apply 
only to the parties, and not to other citizens who might disagree - an 
argument Lincoln made at least as early as his debates with Senator 
Douglas over Dred Scott. To allow Court decisions to have a broader 
effect, Lincoln concluded, would deprive the people of the right of 
self-government. "[I]f the policy of the government upon vital ques­
tions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions 
of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation 
between parties in personal actions," he declared, "the people will 
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept. 11, 1804, in 10 WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 89 n.1 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). 
38. See John C. Yoo, The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and 
Presidential Power, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1435, 1449-50 (1999). 
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). 
40. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, in 2 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A 
COMPILATION OF THE MEsSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 582 (1896). 
41. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, Mar. 4, 1861, in 6 JAMES D. 
RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MEsSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 9 
(1896). 
42 Id. 
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have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically re­
signed their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."43 
This Jefferson-Lincoln view of judicial power, one consistent with 
the reasoning of Marbury, bears several implications for the selection 
of Supreme Court Justices. Coordinate constitutional review reduces 
the importance of appointments to the Court. If the Court's decisions 
do not extend so broadly as to bind other government actors, and if 
the other branches play an equal, coordinate role in making constitu­
tional law, then it may not be as important that the Court serve a rep­
resentative function. As the Court is not irrevocably fixing "the policy 
of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people," 
democratic government may not require that the Justices act in sync 
with the elected branches or with popular wishes. Further, the narrow 
scope of judicial review allows the people to resort to other political 
avenues, such as the executive or legislative branches, to correct erro­
neous (or undesired) Court decisions. While the Court may still act in 
a countermajoritarian manner, its reach is limited to individual cases. 
If the Court has interpreted the Constitution in a way that is accept­
able to the political system, then its norms will spread throughout not 
just the judiciary, but the political branches as well. If not, then oppo­
nents can turn to the political system to challenge, narrow, and per­
haps overturn the effects of a Court decision. This reduces the need to 
resort to the appointments process as a second-best method for re­
versing the Court's long-term policy direction. Rather, the President 
and Senate can seek nominees who excel at deciding cases, the pri­
mary purpose for the federal courts. 
Interest in the ideological positions of nominees, however, be­
comes increasingly significant to the political branches once their free­
dom to interpret the Constitution comes under challenge. Many aca­
demics, such as Carter, Nagel, and Peretti, view the recent struggle 
over the appointments process as an almost inevitable consequence of 
the expansion of judicial review to many of the social issues of the day. 
There is much truth to this observation, but it is not the only change in 
judicial review that has contributed to the politicization of the ap­
pointments process. Of equal, if not greater, importance has been the 
Court's movement toward judicial supremacy in recent decades. The 
Court's expansion into areas of social concern, standing alone, does 
not seem sufficient to generate all of the political controversy over ju­
dicial nominations, given the record of limited compliance with Su­
preme Court decisions. Judicial resolution of questions concerning 
privacy, criminal rights, and race relations may explain why different 
groups display interest in Court nominations, but not why the leaders 
of the other branches of government do. Previous historical periods, 
43. Id. 
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in which the Court played a central role in national controversies, such 
as those over the national bank, the extent of Reconstruction, or gov­
ernment regulation of the economy, did not witness the rise of politi­
cal interest in the ideology of nominees to the Court (as opposed to 
those of the sitting Justices) that characterized the Bork nomination. 
While the New Deal period did focus political attention on the ideol­
ogy of nominees, this was a single-issue concern - whether nominees 
supported the expansion of federal power during the Great Depres­
sion - rather than a consideration of a nominee's broader views on 
policy or even constitutional theory. Until Judge Bork, it appears that 
the Senate had never rejected a Supreme Court nominee because of 
his jurisprudential views.44 
All of that has changed, and it seems that the Court's recent effort 
to transform judicial review into a doctrine of judicial supremacy is an 
indispensable contributing factor. The emergence of judicial suprem­
acy certainly seems to have occurred at the same time as the rise of in­
terest in the ideological views of the Justices. Marbury v. Madison, as 
noted above, did not rest on a claim that the Court had the final, de­
finitive say on interpreting the Constitution, only that its power to de­
clare laws unconstitutional arose from its duty to decide cases. It was 
not until Cooper v. Aaron in 1958 that the Court first clearly declared 
that its interpretations of the Constitution bound all other government 
officials.45 Not only did the Court declare that its opinions were the 
"supreme Law of the Land," but that it was "supreme in the exposi­
tion" of the Constitution.46 Cooper identified the Constitution with 
the Court's decisions as well as with the constitutional text. Commen­
tators at the time launched scathing attacks upon the Court's claim,47 
although some more recently have sought to defend Cooper as neces­
sary to ensure compliance by state officials with Brown v. Board of 
Education.48 Indeed, the Court's declaration of its own supremacy did 
little to overcome the massive resistance to Brown by state and local 
44. See NORMAN VIEIRA & LEONARD GROSS, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS: 
JUDGE BORI< AND THE POLITICIZATION OF SENATE CONFIRMATIONS 37-50 (1998). 
45. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
46. Id. at 18. 
47. See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 259-64 (1962); PHILIP KURLAND, POLITICS, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 116 (1970); Henry Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: the Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1363 n.2 (1973); J. Harvie Wilkinson, 
The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970, 64 VA. L. REV. 485, 520 
(1978). 
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: 
Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387. 
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officials, which did not begin to wane until the late 1960s with more 
vigorous enforcement of civil rights by the political branches.49 
While the Warren Court may not have truly claimed supremacy 
over the coordinate branches, its more conservative successors took 
the next step. In United States v. Nixon, the Burger Court claimed for 
itself the right to make final determinations on the scope of executive 
privilege, found that the judiciary's constitutional need for the Water­
gate tapes superseded the executive branch's desire for secrecy, and 
ordered President Nixon to produce the tapes.50 While recognizing 
that the President enjoyed an executive privilege in limited cases, the 
Court held that the President could not impose an absolute shield on 
all communications with his subordinates. Rather, secrecy in execu­
tive communications had to yield to the judiciary's need for informa­
tion to conduct criminal trials. Most importantly, the Court rejected 
the claim that the President possessed the constitutional authority to 
determine independently questions of executive privilege. Where 
Cooper established judicial supremacy over the states, Nixon extended 
it to the Presidency. One might argue, as the Nixon Court did, that 
Nixon only applied the rules of Marbury. In Marbury, however, the 
Court did not issue an order to an executive official, nor did it claim 
that its interpretation of the Constitution in the course of doing so 
would be supreme. 
Despite its alleged efforts to reverse the Warren Court revolution, 
the Rehnquist Court has actually expanded the judiciary's claims to 
supremacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,51 the Court reaffirmed 
the core holding of Roe v. Wade: that a constitutional right to privacy 
included a woman's right to an abortion. Declaring its resistance to 
political and popular efforts to reverse Roe, the unprecedented plu­
rality decision seemed to tie the Court's legitimacy and power to the 
very idea of the rule of law. "To all those who will be so tested by 
following, the Court implicitly undertakes to remain steadfast, lest in 
the end a price be paid for nothing," the plurality of Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter declared.52 
So, indeed, must be the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live 
according to the rule of law. Their belief in themselves as such a people 
is not readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested 
49. The Court would not seek vigorous enforcement of Brown v. Board of Education 
until Congress had enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. 
County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
50. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
51. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
52 Id. at 868. 
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with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before 
all others for their constitutional ideals.53 
In Casey, the plurality argued that its right to decide cases was more 
than that; its power to interpret the Constitution was the power to 
"callO the contending sides of a national controversy to end their na­
tional division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Consti­
tution."54 The Casey Court argued that due to the Court's supreme 
power to decide constitutional questions, the other branches, and the 
people, had to accept the judiciary's resolution of great political and 
social questions, and end their efforts at resistance. 
While one might dismiss Casey as the excessive rhetoric of a plu­
rality, City of Boerne v. Flores55 made clear the Rehnquist Court's be­
lief in its own supremacy. In response to Employment Division v. 
Smith,56 Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
("RFRA")57 to restore the strict standard of review for laws that bur­
den free exercise rights. It claimed the authority under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to decree the substance of the Bill of 
Rights as they applied to the states. The Court, however, rejected a 
congressional role in interpreting the Bill of Rights at variance with its 
decisions. "As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substan­
tive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, are self-executing," Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court.58 
"The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy re­
mains in the Judiciary."59 Dispelling any doubt about its plenary pow­
ers, the Court emphasized that it exercises "primary authority to in­
terpret" the Constitution's prohibitions on government action.60 
According to the Court, Congress can only enact remedial legislation 
to enforce the Bill of Rights, as interpreted by the judiciary. Last 
term, in United States v. Morrison,61 the Court reaffirmed the logic of 
Boerne by striking down a statute that provided a civil remedy for 
violence against women. No Justice has dissented from the judicial 
supremacy holdings of either Boerne or its progeny. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 867. 
55. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
56. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that neutral, generally applicable laws may restrict re· 
ligious practices even when not supported by a compelling government interest). 
57. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb · bb-4 (1994). 
58. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. 120 S. Ct. 1720 (2000); see also United States v. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) 
(invalidating federal statute that attempted to reverse Miranda warnings). 
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For all of the concern over a conservative judicial counter­
revolution, on the issue of judicial supremacy the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts have fully embraced and even expanded Cooper. 
Where Cooper announced that the Court's interpretations of the Con­
stitution bound state officials, a result possibly consistent with the de­
partmentalist approach to constitutional review, Nixon and Boerne 
expanded the Court's supremacy over the coordinate political 
branches. Casey suggested that the Court's decisions even precluded 
citizens and groups from actively dissenting from judicial interpreta­
tion of the Constitution. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' aggres­
sive rhetoric has not been the only distinctive characteristic of the re­
cent rise of judicial supremacy; the surrender of the other branches 
has proven truly remarkable. In the Watergate Tapes case, President 
Nixon readily complied with the Court's demand for production. Two 
decades later, President Clinton failed to challenge the Court's su­
premacy in determining the boundaries of executive privilege in 
Clinton v. Jones. Despite the nearly unanimous support in Congress 
for RFRA, Congress obeyed the Court's decision and has not yet en­
acted another statute challenging Smith. Congress has not even at­
tempted to employ its own plenary powers, such as through the 
Spending or Commerce Clause, to convince states to protect religious 
liberty.62 To be sure, one might claim that the notion of judicial su­
premacy had gained wider acceptance throughout society well before 
Cooper, Nixon, Casey, and Boerne, because of the need to have a final 
resolver of constitutional uncertainty. It is unclear, however, when 
this idea firmly took root in the absence of judicial decisions that ar­
ticulated the concept and put it into practice. 
Judicial supremacy changes the constitutional structure in a way 
that leads to the more political appointments process that we have to­
day. Ending departmentalism closes off many of the valid methods for 
resistance to the Court's decisions. As demonstrated by the Virginia 
and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, Jefferson and Madison believed 
that states could declare their opposition to unconstitutional actions of 
the federal government. It is still a matter of historical dispute 
whether they believed that the states could go farther in interposing or 
nullifying unconstitutional federal laws.63 Cooper and, more impor­
tantly, Casey have formally blocked off that avenue of resistance. 
Several Presidents, including not just Jefferson and Lincoln, but also 
62 See Jesse H. Choper, On the Difference in Importance Between Supreme Court Doc­
trine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 1996-97 Term, 19 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2259 (1998) (proposing ways to enact a religious freedom statute after 
Boerne). 
63. For an interesting discussion of the differences between Jefferson and Madison on 
this point, and its relevance to the political struggle over nullification, see DREW MCCOY, 
THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON AND THE REPUBLICAN LEGAcY 139-51 
{1989). 
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Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt, believed that the other 
branches of government could take action, at odds with the Supreme 
Court, based on their own interpretation of the Constitution. Nixon 
and Boerne have formally eliminated the possibility that the coordi­
nate branches can use their powers to resist and frustrate Court deci­
sions. According to Casey, at some point even the people must cease 
their struggles and accept the Court's resolution of a controversial 
constitutional issue. To be sure, the Court's decisions cannot force the 
states, the other branches, or the people from challenging Supreme 
Court decisions. Nonetheless, these decisions declare such action to 
be constitutionally illegitimate and a virtual attack on the rule of law. 
Foreclosing the legitimate methods for resisting Court decisions 
naturally leads to the politicization of the appointments process. 
When the Court decides to invalidate moral, social, or economic leg­
islation as unconstitutional, it has removed an area of policymaking 
from the political arena. Judicial supremacy, as advanced by the 
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts, seeks to remove any legiti­
mate methods using the coordinate political branches or the states to 
challenge this transfer of issues from the political to the legal sphere. 
Once individuals and groups cannot turn to their elected representa­
tives or even to their own efforts at direct action to promote their con­
stitutional visions, they must turn to the appointments process to 
change the direction of the Supreme Court. Efforts to inject politics 
into the selection of judicial nominees actually embody the polity's 
ongoing discussion concerning the values that will govern society. By 
constitutionalizing more areas of life, and by pursuing the notion of 
judicial supremacy, the Court itself has shunted normal political activ­
ity from the world of policy into the world of Court appointments. 
Indeed, the Court's claim to supremacy may also have triggered 
the emergence of political campaigning techniques in the appoint­
ments process. In seeking to reverse undesirable Court decisions, 
players in the political process (not just interest groups, but also politi­
cal parties and individual members of the House and Senate) must go 
farther than merely altering the Court's jurisprudential instincts. They 
also must seek the appointment of individuals who are likely to re­
verse particular decisions and doctrines. This is no easy task because 
individuals do not resemble legislation, which can be assembled piece 
by piece to achieve consensus, and they cannot be recalled once con­
firmed. This difficulty in reversing Court decisions, in contrast to the 
more precise methods offered by presidential order or congressional 
statute, may explain (without justifying) why different political actors 
have employed such exaggerated claims and aggressive tactics in sup­
porting or opposing Court nominees. 
These two approaches to the role of courts yield different implica­
tions for the appointment process. Under a theory of coordinate con­
stitutional review, in which each branch of government interprets the 
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Constitution in the course of executing its own duties, a President and 
Senate can focus upon appointing judges who demonstrate the quali­
ties of outstanding lawyers. According to Marbury, Jefferson, and 
Lincoln, constitutional interpretation arises from the judiciary's pri­
mary function of deciding cases. Therefore, the President and Senate 
should strive to select nominees whose qualifications and records sug­
gest that they would excel at deciding cases in as impartial a manner as 
possible, by practicing the lawyerly craft according to the best stan­
dards of the legal profession. This is not a plea for common law con­
stitutionalism in judicial selection, or an argument on behalf of judicial 
minimalism.64 One can select Justices who both excel at practicing the 
lawyer's craft and are capable of developing a broad constitutional vi­
sion, such as Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story.65 Rather, the 
originally modest grounds for judicial review suggest that the ap­
pointments process should seek those whose background, character, 
and qualifications suggest that they would make impartial adjudicators 
of disputes. 
A system of coordinate constitutional review reduces the impor­
tance of judicial appointments in the political system. Selecting superb 
lawyers makes it less likely that the Court will expand beyond its func­
tion of dispute resolution into that of final constitutional arbiter. On 
this understanding, leading politicians or constitutional law theorists 
might make the worst possible appointees, because they might only be 
interested in pursuing their own ideological agenda and in increasing 
their power through the expansion of judicial supremacy. Jeffersonian 
departmentalism establishes three centers of power in the process of 
constitutional interpretation, which reduces the comparative impor­
tance of the Court in the resolution of great social questions. Even if 
the political branches err and select nominees who seek to pursue 
their own personal policy preferences, coordinate constitutional re­
view limits the damage by providing for multiple avenues of resistance 
and opposition. Political actors need not devote substantial resources 
to Court appointments because they have other methods to achieve 
their political goals. Of the two different theories of judicial review, 
this one best fits the approaches that Y alof describes were pursued by 
many Presidents. A theory of coordinate review means that Presi­
dents can choose to use judicial selection for purposes other than pur­
suing preferred ideological agendas because selections to the Court 
are not so important that mistakes cannot be corrected. 
64. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
65. This idea is similar to Neal Devins's point criticizing Sunstein's arguments for judi­
cial minimalism as "0% principle 100% of the time." See Neal Devins, The Democracy­
Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1992 n.84 (1999) (book review). 
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Under a theory of judicial supremacy, however, the appointments 
process assumes a more crucial role. Once the Court's interpretation 
of the Constitution assumes finality and supremacy, controlling the 
Court's direction becomes a valuable prize in the political struggle 
over policy. With other methods for influencing constitutional law 
precluded, changing the personnel on the Court becomes the only way 
to win this contest. One then would expect either the President or the 
Senate to seek to fill the Court with Justices who share their policy 
preferences in an effort to lock in their policies well beyond the next 
election. Political actors with these goals in mind ought to select 
nominees with very different backgrounds from those of the depart­
mentalist model. Rather than lawyers, the judicial supremacist might 
seek out political leaders, constitutional theorists, and even philoso­
phers, who not only agree with the ideological views of the President 
or Senate, but also believe that the Court should retain the final say on 
the interpretation of the Constitution. Because of the high stakes in­
volved, Senators would pay little deference to the President's selec­
tion, and one would expect voting in the Senate to follow party lines. 
If the Court were to enjoy the power in the American political sys­
tem called for by judicial supremacy, it would be surprising if the po­
litical players did not seek to influence the judiciary to achieve their 
goals. In this respect, the features of the appointments process shaped 
by a context of judicial supremacy are similar to those predicted by 
Peretti's arguments for a political Court. Neither Peretti nor the judi­
cial supremacy approach, however, explains why recent Presidents 
have nominated Justices such as Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, and why the Senate has swiftly and easily confirmed them. At 
the time of their nomination, these last four appointments to the 
Court did not fit the model of the politically astute leader or the broad 
constitutional theorist, nor were they closely identified with any juris­
prudential agenda. The recent record indicates that divided govern­
ment can produce a surprising twist in the political model of the ap­
pointments process. When opposite political parties control the 
Presidency and the Senate (or even when the President's party lacks a 
filibuster-proof majority in the Senate), their efforts to pursue their 
agendas through Court appointments may cancel each other out. 
Ironically, this leads to the selection of the same class of nominees as 
the departmentalist approach, which emphasizes lawyers over ideolo­
gies. 
CONCLUSION 
These different approaches to judicial review bear different impli­
cations for reform of the appointments process. After the Bork and 
Thomas fights, numerous remedies have poured forth to fix the con­
firmation mess. Some critics have proposed a more influential and 
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permanent pre-nomination role for the Senate;66 some want more 
questioning of nominees in open Senate hearings,67 while some want 
less;68 some think that a nominee's qualifications are all that matter,69 
while some believe that political views are just as important; some 
think that nominees should announce criteria for confirmation in ad­
vance;70 some would like to see less interest-group involvement;71 some 
think a two-thirds requirement for confirmation would improve 
things,72 while others have become enamored by the idea of judicial 
term limits.73 Most of these reforms view the politicization of ap­
pointments - whereby I mean the effort by the political branches to 
achieve their policy goals by applying standard legislative and cam­
paign techniques to nominees - as an enduring feature of the modern 
process, whether one believes it is desirable or not. . 
Yalof and Peretti seem to assume that the rise in the politicization 
of the appointments process will be a permanent development as well. 
For Yalof, Presidents face a trade-off between achieving their juris­
prudential agenda and seeking a cooperative relationship with the 
Senate. Presidents must decide whether risking a confrontation with 
the Senate - by nominating an ideologically pure but politically con­
troversial Justice - is worth the political capital that they may need 
for other issues. For Peretti, Presidents and Senators must act in the 
appointments arena to achieve their ideological goals, just as they 
would with legislation. She views the politicization of judicial selec­
tion not only as inevitable, but as a welcome event. The more honest 
the political actors are in the appointments process, the more open the 
debate over our politics will be, and the more democratically represen­
tative our Justices will be. Further, Peretti would expect that the ap­
pointments process ideally should yield politicians who are both inter­
ested in acting in harmony with the political branches but also wish to 
expand the political power of the Court. 
66. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 4. 
67. See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Questioning of Supreme Court Nominees at Senate 
Confirmation Hearings, 62 TuL. L. REV. 109 (1987). 
68. See, e.g., Norman Vieira & Leonard E. Gross, The Appointments Clause: Judge 
Bork and the Role of Ideology in Judicial Confirmations, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 311, 332-33 
(1990); Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1146, 1162-63 (1988). 
69. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 4. 
70. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and 
Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969, 992 (1992). 
71. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices 
in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 580-86 (1988). 
72 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief History of the Politics of Supreme 
Court Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. l, 14-16 (1991). 
73. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE L.J. 541 (1999) 
(book review). 
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Recent changes in the appointments process are no doubt a 
reaction by the political system to the growth of the influence of the 
Court in everyday life. As I have argued, this has resulted not just 
from the extension of the Constitution to many areas of social life, but 
also from the modem rise of judicial supremacy. If we are to engage 
in a reform of the appointments process, with the object of removing 
the excessively political techniques that Presidents, Senators, and 
interest groups have brought to bear, we must change the importance 
of the Supreme Court in American life. When the Court no longer 
ultimately determines the great controversies of the day, the other 
actors in the political system will not place so much importance on 
controlling the selection of the Justices. Achieving this end can take 
two possible paths: reversing the Court's modem extension of the 
Constitution into any number of issues that strike at individuals' 
moral, ethical, religious, or social beliefs; or reaffirming the notion of 
coordinate constitutional review and rejecting the Court's efforts to 
seize supremacy in interpreting the Constitution. 
The first approach seems neither realistic nor desirable. At this 
point, the Court is not going to engage in the wholesale surrender of 
its Equal Protection, Due Process, or First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Even if it were willing, the Court cannot resign from the job of 
defending individual rights. Despite recent calls from both the right 
and the left to do away with judicial review, it is a necessary function 
of the federal courts to refuse to enforce laws that come into conflict 
with the Constitution. Reversing judicial supremacy, however, seems 
far more practical and worthwhile. Like fear, judicial supremacy 
exists only if the other branches of government and the people believe 
it to exist. No matter how strident the Court's claims to supremacy, 
the political branches can reject the notion simply by continuing to 
interpret the Constitution themselves, by enforcing their own 
constitutional visions using their own powers, and by, at times, 
ignoring the Court. For example, while Congress may respect Boerne 
for the idea that the courts cannot be drafted into enforcing a different 
interpretation of the Constitution, Congress should still use its plenary 
powers to expand the protections for religious freedom. While Nixon 
and Clinton did not present the best test cases, a future President 
might challenge judicial supremacy by refusing to comply with judicial 
discovery orders for privileged material.74 
This second course of action for reforming the confirmation mess 
is more appealing because much of it can be achieved by the unilateral 
action of the political branches. By contrast, other efforts at reform 
seem somewhat quixotic because the Court is not going to withdraw 
74. This is what I believe Jefferson initially did in the Burr case, which led him and 
Chief Justice Marshall to reach an accommodation between the branches over executive 
privilege. See Yoo, supra note 38. 
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from the race, privacy, criminal procedure, religion, or speech areas; 
the Senate is not going to impose a two-thirds vote requirement for 
confirmation; and we are not going to amend the Constitution to im­
pose term limits on judges. Less sweeping procedural changes in the 
appointments process will not make much difference unless we first 
decide upon the normative goal that ought to guide the selection and 
confirmation of Supreme Court Justices. 
If the political actors wish to counter the Court's drive toward su­
premacy, it can use the appointments process to begin a transition 
back to a system of coordinate constitutional review. This approach 
might bear many advantages over immediate efforts to deny the 
binding effect of Supreme Court decisions, as the Court's function in 
promoting the rule of law may have important benefits for political 
stability. But the President and Senate can begin the transitional pe­
riod by seeking nominees who deny the Court's own supremacy. 
While the goal is to reduce value-voting among the Justices, nominat­
ing individuals for their specific views on constitutional interpretiltion 
may be necessary in order to reverse the recent trend. Further, ap­
pointing Justices because of their views on constitutional and legal in­
terpretation does not place nearly as much strain on our democratic 
system as does the appointment of Justices for their views on policy. 
Appointing lawyerly craftsmen to the Court might not be sufficient 
to effect this transformation, as they would feel bound to respect 
precedent, even that which expands the Court's power. Instead, po­
litical actors with these goals in mind might seek, as ideal nominees, 
lawyers or lower court judges who have worked in the executive or 
congressional branches, especially in capacities where they worked on 
constitutional issues. These lawyers are more likely to possess a de­
veloped sensitivity to the constitutional prerogatives of the President 
and Congress, and they are less likely to be wedded to the notion that 
the Court must be supreme in the interpretation of the Constitution. 
The political branches might seek academics and intellectuals, not 
limited to just lawyers or law professors, who also doubt the Court's 
role as final expositor of the Constitution and its role as arbiter of so­
cial controversies. Regardless of the outcome of the next presidential 
election, that is a litmus test upon which both the President and Senate 
could agree. 
